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ABSTRACT 
The jurist Carl Schmitt’s views on the total state and race need further clarification as 
long as the English language edition of his Concept of the Political presents an apologist 
commentary. The questions are to which degree Schmitt’s works written during the Weimar 
Republic are tainted with totalitarian and racist ideas and whether Schmitt gave up fundamental 
principles during Nationalist Socialism. This thesis examines writings by Schmitt between 1913 
and 1940 to reconstruct a coherent anti-individualistic legal viewpoint and its arguments. The 
first part finds that Schmitt undermines the individual rights of the Weimar Constitution. The 
second part discusses Schmitt’s role as a theorist of totalitarianism. The third part considers 
Schmitt’s anti-Semitism as underlying motivation for his political theory and analyzes his racism 
in light of his anti-individualism. Schmitt frequently argues by invoking the necessity of history 
and by justifying political action as necessary. These arguments should be rejected.  
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1 
Introduction 
The jurist Carl Schmitt’s rejection of individualism, a coherent line throughout his work, 
is key to his philosophical and political position. An entry in the Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences from 1930 states that 
[a]ll modern political theory, except the theory of Bolshevism and of Fascism is 
individualistic in that it seeks to find room for and encourage the individual moral 
judgement and is based on toleration and the maintenance of a system of rights.1  
If that characterization is correct, there are several ways to locate Schmitt’s position, which does 
not incorporate any of those features. The first would be to consider him to be not modern at all. 
The second interpretation is that Schmitt is fascist, in consideration of his theoretical and 
practical engagement in Hitler’s Nationalist Socialist party. Another concern regarding 
Schmitt’s position is his anti-Semitism.  One way to explain Schmitt’s endorsement of laws 
against Jews and his comments on race during his Nazi engagement is to isolate that time and 
explain his behavior as “opportunistic.”2 According to George Schwab, Schmitt adopts 
“overnight…his accommodation to some extent to the central vogue of Nazism, anti-
Semitism…” and is “prepared to sacrifice a fundamental principle for an opportunistic reason.”3 
If Schmitt were merely an opportunist during the time in question, between 1933 and 1936, one 
could hold the rest of his work, both before and after, to be unaffected by anti-Semitism.  
According to Schwab, Schmitt remains “one of the foremost legal and political thinkers that 
Germany has produced in [the twentieth] century”4 and “has never entertained the thought of a 
totalitarian state.”5 Schwab’s views on Schmitt are still prominent in the English language 
1 A.D. Lindsay, “Individualism”, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York, 1930-35, Vol. VII, 676. Quoted 
in Lukes, Individualism, 42.  
2 George Schwab, “Carl Schmitt: Political Opportunist?” Intellect (February 1975):334-337. 
3 Ibid. 336. 
4 Ibid. 334. 
5 George Schwab, Footnote P. 39 in Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. 
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edition of The Concept of the Political,6 which Schwab has translated, introduced and 
annotated. Because there is now evidence to the contrary, in English accessible through 
Reinhard Mehring’s newly translated biography7, Schmitt’s views on the total state and on race 
should be thoroughly reassessed. 
My aim is to find out whether Schmitt’s critique of individualism can provide an 
underlying principle from which we can understand his works to be coherent, without resorting 
to the charge of opportunism. If anti-individualism is one of Schmitt’s underlying principles, 
can it help explain his Nazi period? The historian Paul Bookbinder suggests that Schmitt’s early 
work already contains the “roots of totalitarianism.”8 Maybe it also contains roots of racism. If 
that is so, how does Schmitt’s subsequent writing during the Weimar Republic cohere with the 
earlier as well his Nazi period work? Coherence does not entail that Schmitt does not change his 
positions over time. Demonstrating the coherence of Schmitt’s anti-individualism points to an 
underlying unity in his thought, which makes it plausible that Schmitt meant what he wrote in 
support of the Nazi regime and its ideology.  
Establishing coherence does not establish a necessary development. Schmitt is an 
established university professor in 1933, known for his national conservatism. He could have 
remained in his teaching position in Bonn, instead of advancing his career at Berlin University 
as a member of the NSDAP, the Prussian state council (Staatsrat), Hans Frank’s Akademie für 
Deutsches Recht and as the head of the German Association of Nationalist Socialist Jurists. Not 
every anti-individualist becomes a Nazi. But Schmitt is an anti-individualist legal scholar who is 
6 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, Expanded Edition, Translated by George Schwab (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 96. 
7 Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: A Biography, trans. Daniel Steuer (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014). 
8 Paul Bookbinder, “Roots of Totalitarian Law: The Early Work of Carl Schmitt,” Social Science, 56:3 (1981), 135-
145, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41884716, accessed on Sep. 3, 2015. 
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determined to replace the modern individual-based law system of the Weimar Republic with a 
Germanic law system based on hierarchical order. After his prescription for a presidential 
dictatorship under Hindenburg is not realized, Schmitt sees in the Nazi state a real chance for 
establishing his goal: a system of law based on inequality. My thesis is that anti-individualism is 
the organizing argumentative principle in Schmitt’s political theory that underlies his 
endorsement both of the total state and of racism. 
In the first section, I look at how Schmitt’s opposition to individualism draws from 
Bonald’s and Maistre’s reaction to the French revolution, how he insists on social order and 
argues against the Kantian or Hegelian principles of autonomy, subjectivity and political 
participation, with special attention to Schmitt’s early and still untranslated work, Der Wert des 
Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen.9 After establishing Schmitt’s theoretical point of 
departure, I discuss his position against individual rights in Legalität und Legitimität.10 The 
second section examines Schmitt’s concept of the total state, which he develops between 1927 
and 1933. An analysis of The Concept of the Political, several essays and Schmitt’s first large 
Nazi publication, Staat, Bewegung, Volk,11 reveals Schmitt’s inclinations toward Italian fascism 
and his justification and enforcement of Nationalist Socialist law. From those findings, the view 
of Schmitt as a theorist and supporter of totalitarianism emerges.  The third section traces 
Schmitt’s anti-Semitic sentiments and pre-1933 Nazi sympathies through his diaries, provides 
historical data and finally tries to show what Schmitt’s view of race means for his political 
theory, and how race is related to his anti-individualism.  
9 Carl Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen (1913), Third, corrected edition (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 2012). 
10 Carl Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität (1932), Eighth, corrected edition (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2012). 
11 Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk: Die Dreigliederung der politischen Einheit  (Hamburg: Hanseatische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1933). 
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1. Individualism  
Schmitt’s view of individualism is negative. In his early texts, the critique is directed 
against the political claims of the French Revolution and the political philosophies of Kant and 
Hegel. He rejects the role of the individual in the justification of the state, rejects individual 
rights and develops a theory of “democracy” based on the people as a whole.  In the course of 
Schmitt’s repudiation, political individualism comes to stand in for political liberalism. “Liberal 
individualism” becomes an antithesis against which Schmitt justifies his own theory of law that 
rejects parliamentarism, the rule of law, division of power, equality and individual rights.  In the 
following, I am going to look at the background of Schmitt’s anti-individualism and its various 
expressions. I argue that Schmitt coherently rejects individual rights, even in the legal theory 
that he presents during the Weimar Republic. Demonstrating the rejection of individual rights as 
a coherent position through several stages of Schmitt’s work helps to establish anti-
individualism as an underlying principle that justifies totalitarianism and racism.  
1.1 Bonald and Maistre 
In his critique of individualism, Schmitt builds on the French philosophers Joseph de 
Maistre and Louis de Bonald. In reaction to the French Revolution of 1789, in which the 
bourgeoisie, as the third estate after the nobility and the clergy, declares universal human and 
civil rights, the two noblemen Bonald and Maistre aim to restore monarchy in France. The term 
“individualism” is first used by Maistre in 1820 as a pejorative, and refers to putting individual 
freedom above the state and traditional society. 12 In Maistre’s theological perspective, the 
single human being is meaningless in the face of providential powers.  Even though more than 
one hundred years pass before Schmitt molds his critiques after Bonald’s Théorie du pouvouir 
12 Lukes, Stephen, Individualism, New York, 1973: Harper & Row, 3-5. 
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from 1796, the theorists’ historical situations are similar. Schmitt’s work during the Weimar 
Republic, 1918 to 1933, can be interpreted as a reaction to the sudden end of German monarchy 
at the loss of World War I and a desire to restore hierarchical order.  
 Similar to Maistre and Bonald, Schmitt hopes to undermine liberty and equality with his 
anti-individualist arguments. Schmitt especially endorses Bonald’s early sociological approach 
that considers the individual to be a product of society:  
Bonald…declares with great definiteness, already in 1796, what [the reaction] is 
about: the contrast of liberal individualism and social solidarity. Not the individual 
human or the mass of individuals is, according to him, the carrier of historical 
activity, but instead the society…that constitutes the individual human.13  
Bonald is acknowledged for his early theories about individuation and language. He is supposed 
to have influenced the French sociologists Comte and Durkheim.  According to his early 
sociological theory, the process of individualization “consisted…in the conversion of an organic 
society into a rabble of disconnected atoms,”14 accompanied by the loss of religious and 
monarchical authority. Schmitt praises Bonald’s contribution to political philosophy in the 
production of a system that incorporates “ideals of social solidarity that can be characterized as 
just as new as those of liberal individualism.” 15 The important question that Bonald raises is 
whether the individual makes itself and makes society, or whether “society makes itself” and 
creates the individual. Schmitt endorses Bonald’s answer that society, rather than the individual, 
is the new central category of historical development, even though the central category of 
Schmitt’s own legal and political orientation will be the people as a whole, the Volk.  
13 Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism (1919), trans. Guy Oakes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press1986), 114-15. 
Schmitt refers to Bonald’s Théorie du pouvouir (1796, no page number).  
14 Nesbitt, Robert. Prejudices: A Philosophical Dictionary. Cambridge, 1982: Harvard UP, 185. 
15 Political Romanticism, 154. 
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1.2 Social Order against Individualism 
 The opposition of individualism and social order is prominent throughout Schmitt’s 
work. In Political Romanticism, first published in 1919, he defends order and hierarchy against 
the individualistic attitudes and political claims of the so-called “political romantics,” a variety 
of writers who express their hopes and ambitions for political participation, during the aftermath 
of the French Revolution.  He finds they lack political substance with their exaggerated self-
importance that, in his view, can only be the product of an “individualistically disintegrated 
society.”16  According to Schmitt, the loss of authority and the newly gained liberties result in a 
…bourgeois world that isolates the individual in the domain of the intellectual, 
makes the individual its own point of reference, and imposes upon it the entire 
burden that otherwise was hierarchically distributed among different functions in 
a social order.17 
In 1934, Schmitt rejects liberal political theories in favor of re-establishing a political system 
based on “concrete order.” He names the German adoption of liberal constitutionalism in the 
nineteenth century as one of the “two great invasions of foreign law,” after the introduction of 
Roman law at the end of the Middle Ages. In the rational law (Vernunftrecht) of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries,18 Schmitt finds elements of both normative and decisionist thought 
that have replaced what he calls the thought of “concrete order,”19 a hypothesized non-abstract 
mode of Germanic thinking from the Middle Ages that he wants to reintroduce after 
constitutional democracy in the Weimar Republic ends. Instead of following rules and statutes, 
the “orders and forms of communal life”20 should be free of the “artificial superstructure of 
16 Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism, 20. Oakes’s term ‘disintegrated’ has a more negative connotation than 
Schmitt’s term ‘aufgelöst’ (dissolved), which is also the term that Hegel uses to describe the 
individualization of society. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Carl Schmitt, Drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens (1934), Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006, 7. 
19 Carl Schmitt, “Unsere geistige Gesamtlage und unsere juristische Aufgabe,” Zeitschrift der Akademie für 
Deutsches Recht, ed. Hans Frank, 1 (1934): 11. 
20 Ibid. 12. 
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universal concepts and general norms,” and instead correspond to the “authentic, essential order 
of a people.”21 Schmitt’s example is the family, which forms a concrete institution within the 
patriarchal order that he sees challenged by the “normativist dissolutions” of the nineteenth 
century.22  
The establishment of a new, anti-individual order is an unwavering principle throughout 
Schmitt’s work. While it is unclear how a feudal order in Germany could also be a new order, it 
becomes evident that Schmitt does have a new world order in mind. His essay from 1929, “The 
Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations,” predicts a new order coming out of intellectual 
and political conquest, in which “spirit struggles with spirit, life with life.”23 At the end of the 
essay, Schmitt places the motto Ab integro nascitur ordo, in his translation: from “the power of 
an integral understanding of this [struggle] rises the order of human things.”24 In 1940, he 
explains how parallel intellectual and physical struggle can lead to a new world order that 
makes the existing—in Schmitt’s view liberal and individualist—international law obsolete:  
When empires collapse and new orders are fought over, the structures of the international 
law systems attributed to the old empires appear in graspable clarity. Then the positivist 
whitewash falls away from the core question which is always also a question of space.25  
 
Schmitt’s supports the claim to an authentic German space with his claim to a new legal order, 
which becomes known as the “German Monroe Doctrine”:  
[T]oday, a powerful German Empire has risen. From a weak and powerless center 
of Europe came a strong…one that is able to let its great political idea, the 
recognition of each people as a living actuality that is determined by Art [kind, 
race], origin, blood and soil, radiate into the Middle and Eastern European space 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 17. 
23 Carl Schmitt, “The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations” (1929). The Concept of the Political, Expanded 
Edition, Translated by George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 96. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Carl Schmitt, “Reich und Raum: Elemente eines neuen Völkerrechts,“ Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches 
Recht, ed. Hans Frank 7:1 (1940: Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung): 201 The publication of his article in 
the journal of Hans Frank’s Academy for German Law provides evidence for Schmitt’s continued 
collaboration and influence after 1936. 
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and is able to reject the meddling of powers that are foreign to the space or not 
ethnic [völkisch]. The deed of the Führer has given the thought of our empire 
political actuality, historical truth and a great future under international law. 
Ab integro nascitur ordo.26 
Whether Schmitt’s vocabulary merely accommodates Nazi ideology, and if so, to what degree, 
is an open question. But the right to space of a people is for Schmitt a basic right resulting from 
concrete order. It also results from the freedom to fight for a new order of masters and slaves.  
1.3 The Individual in the State—Plato against Kant and Hegel 
In his 1913 habilitation, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen,27 
Schmitt sets the task for a social re-ordering in which rights are not universal or general, but 
apply only to privileged groups:  
The ancient philosophers divided humanity into two halves, into masters and 
slaves, those who were able to hold rights and those who were not…Today, we 
praise ourselves that we don’t acknowledge such external factors anymore and 
don’t make a difference between persons before the law. But we should know that 
the meaning of our universal human freedom can only be, to work out the 
dualism in greatest objectivity, undeterred by the given social power relation-
ships between groups, so that it is not external contingencies that decide.28  
 
Schmitt writes against the equal treatment before the law for all citizens of the second German 
empire, including Jewish emancipation, granted in its constitution of 1871.29 But Schmitt goes 
further and denies that anyone should hold rights in the form of individual civil liberties. He 
argues that “[i]t is misleading to speak of the freedom of the individual as a boundary for the 
26Carl Schmitt, “Der Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht.” Positionen und Begriffe: im Kampf mit Weimar—Genf—
Versailles 1923-1939 (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1940), 313. The Latin motto is missing in 
the reprint, “Völkerrrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte,“ Staat, 
Großraum, Nomos: Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916-1969. Ed. Günter Maschke (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1995). Schmitt includes this motto in several works. 
27 Carl Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen (1913), Third, corrected edition (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 2012). 
28 Ibid. 92-93. My translation. 
29 Gesetz betreffend die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches vom 16. April 1871, online 
http://www.verfassungen.de/de/de67-18/verfassung71-i.htm, accessed on Jan. 20, 2016 
                                                 
9 
state.”30 Civil liberties, which would guarantee specific freedoms in the form of individual 
rights, violate Schmitt’s understanding of law (Recht, right) as a privilege of the state. He 
further argues that “[s]peaking of freedom would mean to conceive of the individual as the 
bearer of rightful claims. Such concrete political demands would presuppose that the state was 
not a pure state of law (Rechtsstaat) but a means for material ends.”31 This claim opposes the 
social welfare legislation enacted under Bismarck as well as much older property rights.  
From a philosophical perspective, Schmitt turns explicitly against Kant. He proclaims 
that “no individual has autonomy in the state.”32  According to Reinhard Mehring, Schmitt 
largely ignores the philosophical importance of Kant and “dismissed the rationalist project of 
philosophical autonomy and reason altogether.”33  Schmitt does not ignore Kantian philosophy 
completely, however; he uses its idea of individual freedom as a caricature, in order to promote 
his own conception of law. In a polemical comment on Kant’s view of Enlightenment, as the 
exit from one’s self-inflicted immaturity, Schmitt writes: 
In this society, it is left to the private individual to be his own priest. But not only 
that. Because of the central significance and consistency of the religious, it is also 
left to him to be his own poet, his own philosopher, his own king, and his own 
master builder in the cathedral of his personality. 34 
The comment is particularly aimed at the self-absorption of the political romantics, but Schmitt 
also dismisses Kant’s claim that human dignity is based on the capacity for moral reasoning.35  
30 WdS, 98. 
31 WdS, 99. In his argument, he turns the concept of Rechtsstaat against its established use. Rechtsstaat means a 
state that follows the rule of law and acts towards its citizens within a constitutional framework, but 
Schmitt defines “pure” Rechtsstaat through its relationship to a super-positive law and excludes the 
individual from that relationship. See also p. 12. 
32 WdS, 101. 
33 Ibid. 304.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), translated and edited by Mary Gregor (NY:  
Cambridge, 1998), 42-43. “…morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which 
alone has dignity.” 
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For Schmitt, dignity belongs to the state, and it can be conferred on an individual only 
insofar as the individual becomes a servant of the state. His model is Plato’s ideal state in which 
“everyone becomes an official, and nothing remains of his particular importance. Rather, all his 
dignity depends on his devotion to the state.”36 Moral autonomy is not completely denied but 
delegated to the private realm, whereas the “meaning (or value) of the individual within the 
state is only measured according to a task.”37 Such a task, however, differs from Kantian duty, 
which is self-imposed. “The state is…the only one who has a duty to law in the eminent sense; 
the concrete individual, on the other hand, is forced by the state, and its duty as well as its 
justification are only the reflex of a compulsion.”38 By placing morality and autonomy outside 
the spheres of law and state, Schmitt also ignores Kant’s claim that autonomous individuals 
have political participation rights.  
Schmitt’s rejection of an active and significant role for the individual in the state is also 
an attack on Hegel’s philosophy: 
The antithesis is that of right and state, not of right and individual, and the 
Hegelian theorem, that right is the unity of impersonal rule and the individual, is 
to be altered to the effect that positive law is the unity of the impersonal, super-
empirical rule and the state.39 
Hegel, in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, conceives of the state as an institution of 
“ethical life.” That means that the state actualizes “concrete freedom,” which requires “that 
personal individuality and its particular interests should reach their full development and gain 
recognition of their right for itself.”40 As an example, Hegel emphasizes that it is part of one’s 
freedom to choose one’s own profession and therefore criticizes Plato’s republic, in which 
36 WdS, 92. 
37 WdS, 87. Schmitt uses the term die Bedeutung des Individuums, in accordance with the title of the book.  
38 WdS, 86. 
39 WdS, 86. 
40 Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820), Ed. Allen Wood, Trans. H.B. 
Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §260. 
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“subjective freedom is not yet recognized, because individuals still have their tasks assigned to 
them by the authorities.”41 The relationship between individual and state is for Hegel 
characterized by the duality of duties and rights: “In the process of fulfilling his duty, the 
individual must somehow attain his own interest and satisfaction…and from his situation within 
the state, a right must accrue to him whereby the universal cause becomes his own particular 
cause.”42 Schmitt’s state, on the other hand, is overbearing: “The state’s organization of power 
stands above any subjectivity, and in its totality uses every individual, even the mightiest 
despot, as a tool.”43 Because of this discrepancy, for Schmitt to draw support from Hegel for the 
conclusion that the state is the “highest ethical authority”44 is highly inappropriate. The problem 
with Schmitt’s state is that it is exactly not ethical in Hegel’s sense.  
Before turning to Paul Bookbinder’s important question whether Schmitt’s anti-
individualism in Der Wert des Staates lays “the basis for his later work and for totalitarian 
law,”45 I would like to investigate Schmitt’s position on individual rights in his critique of the 
liberal democracy of the Weimar Republic.  
 2.4     Individual Rights—For or against Weimar? 
During the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), Carl Schmitt becomes one of the foremost 
critics of the new parliamentary democracy and the proponent of an alternative presidential 
system.  As a professor of public law in Berlin, he becomes an expert on the first democratic 
constitution, the Weimarer Reichsverfassung (WRV) of August 11, 1919.46 Because of his 
41 Ibid. § 262, Addition. 
42 Ibid. § 261. 
43 Ibid. 
44 WdS, 108. 
45 Bookbinder, 133. 
46 Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches („Weimarer Reichsverfassung“) online, 
http://www.verfassungen.de/de/de19-33/verf19-i.htm, accessed Jan. 23, 2016. 
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earlier endorsement of an authoritarian state, which also implies the rejection of the Prussian 
Constitution of 1871, a question arises about Schmitt’s support for the Weimar constitution and 
his position on its political system and its protection of individual rights. In the following, I aim 
to demonstrate that Schmitt did not support individual rights. Schmitt might have “extolled the 
Weimar state,”47 but he condemns its political system. 
Schmitt criticizes the parliamentary system as an individualistic element. The secrecy 
and isolation of the voting individual is a direct expression of individualist liberalism. Schmitt’s 
distrust of the individual is already prominent in Wert des Staates, where he assumes that claims 
for individual freedom result in material claims against the state, as he takes the citizens to be 
solely interested in their material welfare.48 The individual, rather than uniting both personal 
and universal interests, as Kant and Hegel assume, is in Schmitt’s view dangerous and pursues 
its unlimited freedom against the state. On the other hand, the work of the state should inspire 
awe—to a degree that the state is able to dam “a sea of unbridled and narrow-minded egoism 
and rawest instincts,”49 with which humans, as individuals or as a mass, aim at “hastily rescuing 
their singular happiness.”50 In the pluralistic parliamentary system, Schmitt sees the political 
parties as mere extensions of individual interests that weaken the state on the outside by pulling 
it into different directions on the inside. This constellation supposedly results in the end of the 
division between political state and non-political civil society: “The state turns into society,”51 
and at the same time loses power over the individual by allowing the proliferation of ideologies 
47 Schwab, 335. 
48 WdS 99. 
49 Ibid. 85. 
50 Schmitt quotes Theodor Däubler, Nordlicht (no page citation). WdS, 85.  
51 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 72. 
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such as humanitarianism and consumerism, technology, social programs, and cultural 
interests.52 For Schmitt, the problem with this development is that 
[t]hese dissolutions aim with great precision at subjugating state and politics, 
partially into an individualistic domain of private law and morality, partially into 
economic notions. In doing so they deprive state and politics of their specific 
meaning.53 
Schmitt’s critique of liberal individualism thus leads him to reject the parliamentary system as a 
remnant of the nineteenth century that served bourgeois interests. This critique, already 
prominent in 1927’s The Concept of the Political, culminates in 1932’s Legality and 
Legitimacy, where Schmitt rejects the legality of the parliamentary system in favor of a 
presidential system that is dictatorial but also “democratically” legitimized by the people, 
through direct vote.  
Schmitt’s attitude towards individual rights is controversial. In Legalität und Legitimität, 
he argues that the Weimar constitution’s first section, the organizational part that stipulates 
individual vote and the parliamentary system, is not compatible with the second part, which 
contains both basic individual rights and institutional guarantees. He would drop the first part: 
If now, in the knowledge that the Weimar Constitution consists of two constitutions, one 
of the two constitutions is up for choice, the decision has to fall for the principle of the 
second constitution and its attempt at a substantial order. The core of the second main 
part of the Weimar Constitution deserves to be liberated from its internal contradictions 
and faulty compromises and to be developed according to its inner logic. If that 
succeeds, the thought of a German constitution is rescued. Otherwise, it will soon be 
over with the fictions of a majority functionalism that is neutral against value and 
truth. 54 
 
Hasso Hoffmann, whose Legitimität gegen Legalität is a widely acknowledged account of 
Schmitt’s work, interprets this proposal to the effect that Schmitt considers the substance of the 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 L&L, 91 
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second part that should be preserved to be the “traditional civil liberties, which Schmitt had 
previously discredited.”55 This view is surprising, because Schmitt does not explicitly state any 
support for civil rights, and also because it is not consistent with Hoffmann’s understanding of 
Schmitt’s doctrines as an attempt to assert an “anti-individualistic…idea of the state.”56 A 
smaller text from 1931 sheds light on what Schmitt might mean in Legalität und Legitimität. 
In Freiheitsrechte und institutionelle Garantien der Reichsverfassung,57 Schmitt 
declares his preference of institutional guarantees over individual rights. He shows that the 
second part of the Weimar constitution contains “two separate ‘principles’ or ‘systems’”:58 
basic rights and institutional guarantees.59 Institutional guarantees provide protections, for 
example for religious institutions, the civil service, and for communal self-administration. 
Schmitt argues that since the constitution requires a two-thirds majority to change institutional 
guarantees, those guarantees have a higher legal status than basic rights, which can be changed 
with a simple majority.  
 Being subject to simple law means that those rights can be limited by the legislature, 
albeit not eliminated. Schmitt argues further that historically (i.e., in the older constitutions), 
basic rights faced the dilemma of being merely programmatic and thus “meaningless with 
regard to positive law” or they needed to be rendered positive by simple statutes. In the first 
case, they would be merely well-meant proclamations or good wishes and not fundamental 
principles. In the second case, they would have only the same priority as other simple statutes 
55 Hasso Hoffmann, Legitimität gegen Legalität: Der Weg der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts, 5th ed. 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002), 115. 
56 Ibid. XXXI. 
57 Carl Schmitt, Freiheitsrechte und institutionelle Garantien der Reichsverfassung (Berlin: Verlag von Reimar 
Hobbing, 1931), 20. 
58 Legalität und Legitimität, 57. 
59 The basic rights include freedom of person (§114), privacy of the home (§115), secrecy of mail and telephone 
(§117), freedom of speech (§118), freedom of assembly (§123), freedom of association (§124) and the 
right to property (§153). 
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and be therefore pointless in terms of constitutional protection.60  Schmitt uses support from the 
jurist Gerhard Anschütz’s commentary, according to which the dilemma that arose in 
guaranteeing basic rights in the Prussian constitution was transferred to the Weimar 
constitution.  Schmitt’s quotes Anschütz, who points out that the constitutional rights of 
Weimar do not legally bind the legislator, for instance they do not forbid emergency laws.  
Schmitt quotes another colleague, Hans Carl Nipperdey, as saying that the guarantees of 
personal freedom, inviolability of the home, and freedom of expression (Articles 114, 115, and 
118) “don’t effect much anyway.”61  
On the other hand, according to Schmitt, institutional guarantees, such as for the civil 
service or religious institutions, are subject to a guarantee by constitutional law 
(verfassungsgesetzliche Garantie),62 because their change requires a super-majority.  Schmitt 
finds the disparity between individual rights and institutional guarantees to be paradoxical and 
“utterly impossible.” 63 His argument, however, does not aim at elevating the status of basic 
rights. Instead, he aims to subsume basic rights under institutional guarantees. He claims that  
…in a democratic constitution, there cannot be privileges for individual rights 
by constitutional law, but that rather each guarantee of subjective rights64 by 
constitutional law can only be thought of within the framework and the limits 
of an institutional guarantee.65 
Schmitt thereby denies the special status of individual rights. In the Weimar parliamentary 
democracy, they can be changed by a simple majority and suspended in a state of exception, but 
in a non-parliamentary system, there would be constitutional guarantees only for institutions.66 
60 Freiheitsrechte, 2. 
61 Freiheitsrechte, 3. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Freiheitsrechte, 4. 
64 Subjective rights can apply to individuals or groups. 
65 Ibid. 20. 
66 Ibid. 
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Schmitt argues that property and freedom are not “institutes”: property has only limited 
institutional character; it is only considered an “institute” if it is tangible (Sacheigentum), and it 
is not immune from dispossession. Freedom is not an institute, and therefore is not subject to an 
institutional guarantee, only to a “guarantee of the traditionally typical degree of legal norm.”67 
Such vague regulations should apply to detention, arrest, search of home or confiscation of 
mail.  
Another consequence of Schmitt’s suggested transformation of individual rights to 
institutional guarantees might be that only members of protected institutions have privileged 
rights. Thereby Schmitt opens the door to inequality before the law. Contrary to Hoffmann’s 
charitable interpretation, Freiheitsrechte und institutionelle Garantien shows that what Schmitt 
means when he speaks of “rescuing” the German constitution is to eliminate civil liberties, 
insofar as they are individual basic rights. 
Schmitt undermines the liberal principles of the Weimar Constitution. According to his 
own interpretation of the constitution in Verfassungslehre from 1928,68 basic rights within the 
Weimar Constitution are components of the “general political decision of the German people 
about its kind of existence”69 as a constitutional democracy.  The Weimar state is a 
“constitutional state, modified by the principles of the ‘civil-rights state’” (bürgerlicher 
Rechtsstaat),70 in which basic rights, even though they can be modified by legal statutes, “can 
neither be eliminated by simple statutes nor by a constitution-changing law, but only by a new 
constitutional act of the German people.”71 Schmitt’s strategy is to drive a wedge between the 
67 Freiheitsrechte, 27. 
68 Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (München/Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1928) 
69 Ibid. 163. 
70 Ibid. 163. 
71 Ibid. 
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two principles of democracy and the civil-rights state of liberal individualism. The underlying 
idea might be to put a new constitution out for a referendum, once a presidential system is 
installed by an emergency plan. In any case, Schmitt aims at a major revision.  
In 1928, Schmitt states that the civil-rights state “is today generally still prevalent.”72 
But this form “should not be elevated to a dogma;” its “historical contingency” and its “political 
relativity”73 should not be ignored. Instead, it should be the task of a constitutional theory “to 
prove how much some traditional formulas and concepts are completely dependent on former 
situations.”74 At the time, those formulas and concepts are for Schmitt “not even old bottles for 
new wine any more, but only outdated and false labels.”75 In his critique of Weimar and its 
liberal and individualist constitution, Schmitt comes to a conclusion that is coherent with his 
theses on the value of the state and the meaninglessness of the individual in Wert des Staates. 
How this position is coherent with Schmitt’s theoretical development of the total state and his 
support of the Nationalist Socialists’ racist ideology will be the topic of the following two 
sections. 
2. The Total State 
Schmitt’s idea of the total state is strongly modeled after Italian fascism. The first 
section’s result, that Schmitt supports a strong state in which the individual is insignificant, does 
not by itself imply that Schmitt supports a fascist system. The encyclopedia entry cited in the 
introduction speaks, after all, of modern theories. Schmitt’s political theory could therefore be 
not modern, but rather reactionary, in support of, for example, conservative nationalism, 
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absolutism or feudalism. But Schmitt considers his theory to be fit for “modern mass 
democracy.”76 This section examines the degree to which the total state is a totalitarian state. 
The scholarly opinions on these question differ widely. George Schwab asserts that Schmitt 
“has never entertained the thought of a totalitarian state,”77 whereas Herbert Marcuse credits 
Schmitt with giving “the best portrayal of liberalism from the standpoint of totalitarian political 
theory.”78 Anthony Court argues that Schmitt “deserves to be acknowledged as the seminal 
theorist of totalitarianism.”79 I will argue that Schmitt anticipated a totalitarian German state, 
modeled after Italian fascism, before 1933 and actively supported a totalitarian German state 
that exceeded the totalitarianism of Italian fascism after 1933. The forms of totalitarianism may 
differ in degree, but not in principle. The less secure individual rights are, the more totalitarian 
the state becomes. 
2.1 The Concept of the Political and the Total State 
Schmitt introduces and develops the concept of a politically strong total state, similar to 
Italian fascism, into the German political discussion between 1927 and 1933. In The Concept of 
the Political, the total state denotes “the identity of the state and society.”80 Schmitt is critical of 
the division between the state and civil society, under which religion, culture, education and the 
economy, as neutral spheres, are separated from state and politics and, in Schmitt’s view, 
76 Carl Schmitt, „Der Gegensatz von Parlamentarismus und moderner Massendemokratie,“ Hochland, 23:4 (June 
1926), 17-270. 
77 George Schwab, CP, fn. 39. 
78 Herbert Marcuse, “Struggle against Liberalism in Totalitarianism,” Negations: Essays in Critical Theory 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 270, fn.10. First published in: Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, 6:3, Paris 
(1934). 
79 Anthony Court, Hannah Arendt’s Response to the Crisis of her Times (Amsterdam/Pretoria: Rozenberg 




80 The Concept of the Political, (CP), 22. 
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governed by “liberal individualism.” We have also seen that he is critical of the identity of 
society and state as a consequence of pluralism. In contrast, the total state “potentially embraces 
every domain”81 and renders “everything…at least potentially political.”82 Because the political 
is for Schmitt defined by the friend/enemy relationship, he wants society to be organized 
accordingly. Under the premise of historical necessity, Schmitt proclaims the “total state” as the 
political form of the 20th century.  He sees the necessity of that development as the result of the 
changes from the absolutism of the 18th century to the liberalism of the 19th to the new situation 
of the 20th century, which must accommodate the political integration of all the people. The 
concept of the total state appears as a “polemical concept against such neutralizations and 
depoliticalizations“83 of the obsolete liberal bourgeois state. Because the total state is inevitable, 
Schmitt thinks that for Germany, the form that the total state should take is decisive. 
While The Concept of the Political does not explicitly state its fascist inclination, two 
lesser known essays that Schmitt publishes in the early 1930s clarify the background of the total 
state. They appear in the journal Europäische Revue, whose publisher, Karl Anton “Prince” 
Rohan, is also the founder of the Europäischer Kulturbund, an organization that stands out for 
its “contribution to the preparation of the conservative revolution and its affinity to Italian 
fascism and German National Socialism.”84 Schmitt contributes two pieces about the total state, 
the first in 1931 and the second in early 1933. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 CP, 22. 
84 Matthias Schulz: Der Europäische Kulturbund, in: Europäische Geschichte Online (EGO), ed. Institut für 
Europäische Geschichte (IEG), Mainz 2010-12-03. URL:  
http://ieg-ego.eu/de/threads/europaeische-netzwerke/politische-netzwerke/europa-netzwerke-der-
zwischenkriegszeit/matthias-schulz-der-europaeische-kulturbund  [accessed on Nov. 6, 2015]. 
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In the first essay, “Die Wendung zum totalen Staat,”85 Schmitt affirms, as the title states, 
the “turn towards the total state.” Schmitt observes the total claims of some political parties on 
their members, by means of youth organizations, cultural clubs etc. Thereby, society becomes 
politicized. Schmitt also finds an indication for the disappearance of the separation between 
state and society in the state’s use of its economic power. By controlling the majority of gross 
income, the government exercises a large economic influence. Old principles of non-
intervention are no longer valid. Yet Schmitt regrets that, despite this development, the division 
into separate parties in Germany prevents the total state from “assert[ing] itself as such”86 with 
the same force as in the “so-called one-party states,” Soviet Russia and Italy. The turn towards 
the total state should, according to Schmitt, be seen as a part of the historical development of 
the twentieth century, in reference to Ernst Jünger’s slogan of “total mobilization.”87 Evoking 
historical necessity, Schmitt claims to “scientifically” observe the development towards the total 
state. He favors abandoning party pluralism in Germany, but does not directly endorse the one-
party state.  
The second essay on the total state, “Weiterentwicklung des totalen Staates in 
Deutschland,”88 is dedicated to the further development of the total state in Germany. Schmitt 
undertakes a comparison between the “current” and the “genuine” total state, in order to analyze 
the “actual situation” in 1932.89 Because the German state remains pluralistic and is being 
drawn in five different directions by the main political parties, Schmitt calls it a “quantitative” 
total state. The political parties penetrate into all spheres of human life, economic, cultural, and 
85 Carl Schmitt, “Die Wendung zum totalen Staat,“ Europäische Revue, 7:1 (1931): 241-250. 
86 Ibid. 247. 
87 Ibid. 242. 
88 Carl Schmitt, “Weiterentwicklung des totalen Staates in Deutschland,” Europäische Revue, 9:1 (1933), 65-70.  
89 Ibid. 66. The article is published in early 1933, but written in late 1932. 
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social and exploit the weakened state with their demands. In contrast, Schmitt praises the 
“genuine” total state and its qualitative intensity. He points to the high political energy of the 
Italian fascist state, which calls itself “stato totalitario.”90 The Italian fascist state has an 
exclusive grip on the new technologies of power—military technology as well as the new 
media, film and radio. Schmitt demands that Germany, in which freedom of the press still 
obtains, also put its hand on the new technologies, practice censorship and control radio and 
cinema, in order to shape public opinion into collective opinion. The second lesson for the 
German state is that a genuine total state can distinguish friend from enemy and does not allow 
any hostile or divisive powers to rise within. In that sense, “each genuine state is a total state,” 
for “the political is the total.”91 The proposal for Germany is a “very strong state”92 that does 
away with the system of multiple parties. Schmitt considers the strengths of the German state to 
be its independent bureaucracy, the military and the presidential power to call for the state of 
exception under §48 of the Weimar Constitution.  
2.2 Stato Totalitario  
Despite Schmitt’s praise of the Italian fascist state, it is controversial whether he actually 
endorses totalitarianism. Schwab states that a totalitarian Germany is “something 
incommensurable” with Schmitt’s political thinking.93 In Schwab’s view, “Schmitt has 
consistently maintained [the] idea” that a political grouping need not “necessarily determine 
every aspect of a person’s life.”94  If Schmitt said that, it would not distinguish his position from 
Italian fascism. In a similar fashion, Mussolini’s (or his philosopher Giovanni Gentile’s) 
90 Ibid. 67. 
91 Ibid. 67. 
92 Starker Staat, 77. The presentation to the Langnam Verein and “Weiterentwicklung” overlap to a large degree. 
93 Schwab, ”Carl Schmitt: Political Opportunist?” 337. 
94 Ibid. 38. No textual support. I have not found a statement by Schmitt to that effect. 
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account of fascism states that “[t]he Fascist State organizes the nation, but it leaves the 
individual adequate elbow room. It has curtailed useless or harmful liberties while preserving 
those which are essential.”95 Before trying to determine whether of Schmitt endorses a 
totalitarian German state, it is useful to look at how close his own political theory comes to 
fascist totalitarianism.  
Before 1933, Schmitt tries to justify a modern form of “democracy.” In 1926, he writes 
that “Bolshevism and Fascism are, like any dictatorship anti-liberal, but not necessarily anti-
democratic.”96 They can “form the popular will and create homogeneity.”97 Schmitt explores 
the alternative “democratic” method of acclamation and even considers the “self-evident, non-
dissenting being there of the people” (selbstverständliches, unwidersprochenes Dasein)98 to be 
a valid political legitimation of the dictator. He appeals to the power of a “democratic feeling,” 
through which “dictatorial or Caesarist methods can be immediate expressions of democratic 
substance and power.”99  Mussolini likewise rejects parliamentary democracy, but uses the term 
“democracy,” calling fascism “an organized, centralized, authoritarian democracy,” in which 
“the masses are not driven back to the margin of the state”100 but instead organized by it. Other 
parallels to Schmitt’s doctrine that can be found in the fascist manifesto are the “rejection of 
95 Benito Mussolini, ”The Doctrine of Fascism “(1932), last accessed on Nov. 12, 2015.   
http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/Germany/mussolini.htm 
 “Far from crushing the individual, the Fascist State multiplies his energies, just as in a regiment a soldier 
is not diminished but multiplied by the number of his fellow soldiers. The Fascist State organizes the 
nation, but it leaves the individual adequate elbow room. It has curtailed useless or harmful liberties while 
preserving those which are essential.” Gentile wrote the first part of “The Doctrine of Fascism,” officially 
assigned to Mussolini as author. Compare Juergen Charnitzky, Giovanni Gentile und der Faschismus: Ein 
Verhältnis zwischen Kohärenz und Ambivalenz. (Frankfurt: Frankfurter Stiftung für deutsch-italienische 
Studien, 1995) and Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il Duce I: Gli anni del consenso 1929-1935, Torino 1974, 
35-38, quoted in Charnitzky, fn. 52. 
96 “ Der Gegensatz von Parlamentarismus und Massendemokratie,“ 269. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 270. See Goering’s reply in Nuremberg. Michael Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945-46: A 
Documentary History (Boston: Bedford, 1997), 104-7. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
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individualism and the importance of the state,” the “definition of fascism as real democracy,” 
the “rejection of economic liberalism” and the “fascist totalitarian vision of the future.”101   
At the end of 1932, Schmitt seems to favor a presidential dictatorship. His proposal for a 
strong civil service that is independent of the political parties is an indication for that.  His 
support for an emergency plan that would extend presidential power under the state of exception 
beyond the legal sixty days, and that would include the use of military power, is documented.102 
But Schmitt’s support for a presidential dictatorship includes a radicalized administration with 
its own powers of taking extraordinary measures. In Legalität und Legitimität, Schmitt lays out 
how, against a powerless legislature, “the executive state and the administrative state are better 
suited as an instrument of radical change, whether revolutionary or reactionary.”103 He predicts 
that the use of institutional state force by an executive, administrative and juridical state against 
the legislative state becomes “inevitable.”104  
That the installation of a drastically different order counts as a rescue of the 
Weimar state, as Schwab charitably assumes, is questionable. The means which the 
radicalized administrative state can employ, in order to undermine the rule of law, 
include “objective necessity, the circumstances, the force of the conditions, the 
emergency of the time and other justifications that are not determined by the norm but 
by the situation.”105  In such conditions and situations, the concrete order—in the sense 
of institutional structure—can be directly transformed into an enforceable order—in  the 
sense of a command.  
101“The Doctrine of Fascism,” (all quotes). 
102 Detlef Junker, Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei und Hitler 1932/33: Ein Beitrag zur Problematik des politischen 
Katholizismus in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett, 1969). 
103 Ibid. 12. 
104 Ibid. 57. The final version of the book is supposed to have been complete ten days before von Papen’s strike 
against Prussia.  
105 L&L, 13. 
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They bring an end to the advocates’ pleas that accompany the juridical state, as 
well as the likewise endless discussions of the parliamentary legislative state and 
recognize in decisionism a positive legal value. Here counts: “The best in the 
world is an order.”106  
So the total state works in executing power from the top down, with the help of a radicalized 
administration that can disrespect individual rights and the rule of law whenever it decides that 
a situation calls for extraordinary measures. As a result of his efforts to mobilize the means for a 
qualitative total state, Schmitt anticipates the Führer state quite well and provides a justification 
for any future regime to use arbitrary means for totalitarian ends. 
2.3 Totalitarian or not? 
Nationalist Socialism brings a break to Schmitt’s efforts for a presidential system. 
Hindenburg names Hitler as chancellor on January 30, 1933, and the emergency decree of 
February 28, 1933, suspends all basic rights of the Weimar constitution107  Schmitt affirms the 
legality of the Enabling Act of March 23, 1933 as his reason to join the NSDAP in April and 
fully immerses himself in the legitimation of the new regime by using his earlier ideas.  
Arguments for a major change in Schmitt’s position come from Anthony Court who 
emphasizes “Schmitt’s abandonment of his doctrine of the sovereign state and his embracing of 
the political primacy of the Nazi political movement.”108 In Staat, Bewegung, Volk, three 
elements form the political unity: state, movement and people. Schmitt states that now the party, 
i.e. the dynamic movement, is the foundation of political leadership, and permeates both the 
106 L&L, 13. 
107 Hindenburg’s emergency decree from February 28, 1933, Reichtstagsbrandverordnung suspended all civil 
rights. http://www.zum.de/Faecher/G/BW/abbl/nationalsozialismus/ermaechtig.htm  
108 Ibid. 
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state and the people.109 The state remains as the “politically static”110 part of the three elements, 
with the people as the apolitical part. Thus the state loses “the monopoly of the political”:111  
The state’s system of agencies and offices by itself is therefore no longer identical 
with the political whole and with an authority that rests in itself. Today, the political 
cannot be determined by the state, but the state must be determined by the 
political.112 
In Court’s view, Schmitt acknowledges the takeover of the state by the party. Court also credits 
Schmitt with recognizing the totalitarian parties’ complete seizure of their members and 
considers Staat, Bewegung, Volk to be “one of the most extraordinary and prescient texts of the 
20th century,”113 a “new theoretical departure”114 toward a more virulent form of totalitarianism 
than in Mussolini’s state. According to Court, Hannah Arendt also recognizes this departure. 
Arendt quotes Schmitt, “The movement…is state as well as people, and neither the present state 
nor the present German people can even be conceived without the movement,”115 from Staat, 
Bewegung, Volk. The institutional structure of the state is not separable from the party. Those 
qualities are, according to Court, “novel ideological and structural features.”116  Schmitt 
explains the difference from the Italian system as the identity of party and state in Germany. 
While in Italy the party is an “organ of the state,” in Germany the party is “the body of 
109 Staat, Bewegung, Volk, 14. 
110 Ibid. 12. 
111 Ibid. 15 
112 Ibid. 
113 Anthony Court, Hannah Arendt’s Response to the Crisis of her Times (Amsterdam/Pretoria: Rozenberg 
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leadership,”117 so that party officials automatically obtain state functions. According to Schmitt, 
“Hegel dies”118 on January 30, 1933, when the Hegelian state of the nineteenth century, whose 
pillar was the civil service (Beamtentum), ends.   
Court agrees with Arendt that the Nazi state is more totalitarian than Italian fascism. In 
Court’s view, the Italian stato totalitario is, despite its dynamic beginnings, in comparison to 
the Nazis, tame and statist because it changes from a revolutionary movement before 1925 to 
“Mussolini’s personal dictatorship of an ideologically ‘fascist’ but institutionally conventional 
authoritarian state dictatorship.”119  Arendt agrees that Mussolini’s dictatorship does not “carry 
essential totalitarian characteristics, as long as it remain[s] relatively independent from the 
dictatorship of the Nazis, until 1938.”120 Arendt finds that the mark of totalitarianism, besides 
the claim to absolute power, secured by propaganda, lies and terror, is that the leadership 
constantly moves power around different organizations.121  In this manner, outside opponents 
are confused, and inside groups compete among themselves, so that the leaderships has options 
and control. Also, the ultimate locus of decision is hidden.122 
In contrast to Arendt’s essentialist perspective, Jürgen Charnitzky views totalitarianism 
as being actualized in stages. He highlights Schmitt’s active role in the development of a higher 
stage of totalitarianism. In his book on Emilio Gentile, Charnitzky argues that Italian fascism 
should not be considered to be “the most radical theory of the totalitarian state,”123 and that 
Schmitt’s systematic juridical and historical justification of the total Führer state surpasses 
117 SBV, 20. 
118 Ibid. 32. 
119 Court, 60 
120 Arendt, 409. 
121 Ibid. 623. 
122 Ibid. 624. 
123 Emilio Gentile, Le origini dell’ideologia fascista (1918-1925), Milano, 1972. Quoted in Charnitzky, 16.  
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Gentile’s abstract schematic theory.124 In response to Arendt’s criteria, that “total domination 
cannot allow free initiative in any area of life”125 and every action needs to be “absolutely 
predictable,”126 it seems more plausible, as Schmitt has already brought forth in The Concept of 
the Political, that the state must potentially take hold of every sphere of life.  Without a division 
of power and individual rights that protect the individual, there is nothing to stop the state (or 
party) from asserting its power.127  
Court’s criticism of Schwab is that he “does not explain why we should not take Schmitt 
at his word.”128 Schwab’s apology for Schmitt is for Court a “thinly veiled attempt to absolve 
Schmitt of his responsibility for a dictatorship he understood only too well.”129 The implication 
is that Schmitt makes a decision to support Hitler even though he fully understands the 
destructive dimensions of Nazi power. Court claims that Schmitt’s complicity in Nazism should 
not detract from his theoretical achievements: “Schmitt’s theorization of the Nazi dictatorship in 
1933 is so original and insightful that he deserves to be acknowledged as the seminal theorist of 
totalitarianism.”130 In support of Court, I can add that The Concept of the Political contains the 
signposts for this radical departure, as diagnosis or as program.  
124 Juergen Charnitzky, Giovanni Gentile und der Faschismus: Ein Verhältnis zwischen Kohärenz und Ambivalenz. 
(Frankfurt: Frankfurter Stiftung für deutsch-italienische Studien, 1995) 
125 Arendt, 544. 
126 Ibid. 
127 For the ensuing debate about the total state, see Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts: Das Rechtsdenken im 
Nationalsozialismus in Originaltexten, ed. Herlinde Pauer-Studer and Julian Fink (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 
2014).  
128 Ibid., 92. 
129 Ibid., 96. 
130 Ibid., 96. 
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Schmitt is not merely a diagnostic, but actively helps to enforce Nationalist Socialist 
rule. Of particular importance for totalitarian practice are his five basic principles for legal 
practice, Fünf Leitsätze für die Rechtspraxis131 from 1933.  The fourth principles states: 
For the application and handling of the general clauses by the judge, attorney, jurist 
and teacher of law, the principles of National Socialism are immediately and 
exclusively authoritative.132  
According to Schmitt, the ruling values, according to which common legal terms are to be 
interpreted, are always the values of a leading and authoritative group or movement. Thus the 
meaning of terms such as “good faith,” “good morals,” “reasonableness,” and “public order and 
safety” are to be determined according to Nazi principles.  
Dirk Blasius documents one of the effects of Schmitt’s broadly distributed publication 
on the enforcement of the race laws passed in the same year. The “Law for the Prevention of 
Genetically Diseased Offspring,”133 stipulating involuntary sterilizations and specifically 
permitting the use of force,134 and the “Law against Dangerous Criminals and the Measures for 
Safeguarding and Amelioration,”135 requiring castrations, are enforced with explicit reference to 
Schmitt’s fourth principle. According to Blasius, Falk Ruttke, one of the laws’ authors, refers to 
Schmitt in front of 120 psychiatrists of the German Association for Psychological Hygiene and 
Racial Hygiene: “He cited verbatim the complete Fourth Principle, and saw in it the critical 
lever to enforce the practical application of the legislation to race hygiene.”136 The result is a 
total of 360, 000 forced sterilizations and about 1,800 castrations. For Blasius, this example of 
an intervention, which affected many individual lives, shows that Schmitt does not merely adapt 
131 Carl Schmitt, Fünf Leitsätze für die Rechtspraxis (Berlin: Deutsch Rechts- und Wirtschafts-Wissenschaft 
Verlags-Gesellschaft, 1933,  
132 Ibid., 2. 
133 “Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses,“ passed on Jan 1, 1934. 
134 Blasius, 158. 
135 “Gesetz gegen gefährliche Gewohnheitsverbrecher und über Maßregeln der Sicherung und Besserung.“ 
136 Blasius, 161-2. 
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opportunistically to Nazism, but formulates extremely effective positions.137 The re-
interpretation of general clauses is pioneering in the history of German law.138 Schmitt’s 
contribution provides the means to overcome the hurdle of the civil code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch, BGB), which remains nominally in force during the whole Nazi period. It means 
that application of the law can be completely changed without the need to change one single 
positive statute, as soon as the general clauses are not interpreted according to the 
individualistic civil society, but to the “interests of the people as a whole.”139 
The racial identity of the German people is, according to Schmitt, basic to Nationalist 
Socialist law. The term preferred by Schmitt and other legal experts is Artgleichheit, in which 
Art is vague enough to connote the neutral kind or the biological species or genus. On the 
difference between Italian fascist and Nationalist Socialist law, Schmitt states that “in Italy, the 
problem of race (Rasse) is ignored.”140 In Germany, the “problem” of race makes totalitarianism 
more thoroughly totalitarian. The next section takes a closer look at Schmitt’s view of race. 
3.  Race 
Schwab’s apology that Schmitt accommodated the anti-Semitism of the Nazis “to some 
extent” out of “opportunism” is falsified with the publication of Schmitt’s diaries.141 Contrary to 
the claim that “[p]rior to Hitler’s accession to power, one never finds any anti-Semitic utterance 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ulrich Eisenhardt, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, 6th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2013), Sec. 870, pp. 398-9. 
139 Carl Schmitt, Juristische Wochenschrift (1934): 717, Quoted in Ulrich Eisenhardt, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, 
6th ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2013), Sec. 870, pp. 398-9. 
140 Carl Schmitt, “Faschistische und nationalsozialistische Rechtswissenschaft,” Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, 10 
(1936): 619-20. 
141 Carl Schmitt, Tagebücher: Oktober 1912 bis Februar 1915, ed. Ernst Hüsmert (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 2003). 
--, Der Schatten Gottes: Introspektionen, Tagebücher und Briefe 1921 bis 1924, ed. Gerd Giesler (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 2014). 
--, Tagebücher 1930-1934, ed. Wolfgang Schuller (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 2010). 
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in any of Schmitt’s writings,”142 the diaries reveal Schmitt’s ongoing hostility to Jews, which 
comes to a culmination in the early 1930s, when Schmitt engages with Nationalist Socialist and 
other racist ideas. In Hitler’s first year of power, Schmitt declares race to be one of the basic 
principles of new state’s law. In 1936, Schmitt presents a racial theory at the conference 
Judaism in Jurisprudence. Because the correspondence of Schmitt’s views on race with some of 
his earlier writings, race can possibly be seen as a coherent theme and organizing factor that 
traverses Schmitt’s work from early on. If Schmitt’s anti-Semitism has “deep emotional and 
cognitive roots,”143 his writings before 1933 need to be examined and possibly re-interpreted, as 
Raphael Gross suggests. Among the topics of this thesis, for example, Schmitt’s discussion of 
individual rights and institutional guarantees in 1931 could be read as an attempt to exclude 
Jews from constitutional rights. In the following, I aim to show how Schmitt’s concept of race 
develops from his early anti-Jewish sentiment to an anthropological concept of Artgleichheit 
that functions as the opposite of a liberal, individualistic concept of equality. 
3.1 The Diaries 
In Schmitt’s view of “the Jews” in his early diaries, his perception of their overbearing 
power and intellectual superiority is prominent. In 1914, he notes that he has a “violent rage” 
against the Jews 
who bother with art, the counterfeiters, who falsify all genuine growth and 
distort the concepts of the humans, the intermediaries and nimble monkeys, who 
can imitate everything so quickly, that one often believes it for months, the 
agents and traders, who consistently confuse applied arts with art, invoke power 
opposite taste and taste opposite power and thereby achieve and use an 
irrefutable position, and, if necessary, even appear as guardians of good 
tradition.144  
142 George Schwab, “Carl Schmitt: Political Opportunist,“ 336 (all quotes). 
143 Raphael Gross, Carl Schmitt und die Juden (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005), 41. 
144 Carl Schmitt, Tagebücher: Oktober 1912 bis Februar 1915. Ed. Ernst Hüsmert (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 
2003), 245-6, entry Nov. 8, 1914. 
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Besides the plain insults, one of the themes in Schmitt’s ongoing hostility to Jews is their 
intellectual power. In an experience recorded in 1915, Schmitt feels inferior when he visits a 
library with his Jewish friend Fritz Eisler. Later that day he notes:  
He read psychology. Amazed and frightened about the power of the Jews.  
Psychoanalysis is the purest expression of Judaism.145  
Schmitt transfers his hostility toward his friend onto the Jews as a group. Between 1930 and 
1933,146 the entries frequently express antipathy or disgust against individuals of Jewish origin 
with whom Schmitt comes in contact at the School of Business Administration in Berlin, where 
he teaches. He notes an “interesting exam of a rather brash Jew”147 and a “[n]ice lecture in front 
of the likeable gentlemen. Not a single Jew.”148 His ambiguous attitude about the Jewish legal 
philosopher Hans Kelsen evokes the same generalization as the Eisler experience earlier:  
Read Kelsen, was pleased with his courage, but then I became frightened about 
the power of the Jews in Germany.149 
Schmitt becomes increasingly familiar with Nationalist Socialist and other anti-Semitic ideas. 
He discusses politics with his friend Heinrich Oberheid, who has joined the NSDAP in 1928.150 
He reads Ludendorff’s book about “the coming world war, with great emotion.”151 In it, 
Ludendorff “declares the Jews, Freemasons and the Roman Catholic Church are planning the 
destruction of the Germans, Austrians, Hungarians and English, and the securing of world 
domination.”152 He reads Goebbels’ Der Angriff,153 in which Goebbels writes about “[t]he 
145 Ibid. 314, entry Feb. 9, 1915. 
146 Carl Schmitt, Tagebücher: 1930 bis 1934, 26, entry Jan. 3, 1930. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 27, entry 3 Mar. 1930. 
149 Ibid. 59, entry 22 Nov. 1930. 
150 Ibid. 50, entry 29 Oct. 1931. 
151 Ibid. 62, entry Nov.29, 1930. CS refers to Erich Ludendorff, Weltkrieg droht auf deutschem Boden (München: 
Ludendorffs Verlag, 1930). Ludendorff led the anti-Semitic Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei (DVFP). 
152 “The Coming War: Ludendorff’s prophecies,” The Daily News, (Perth, W.A., 27 May 1931). Online, accessed 
Feb 5, 2016. http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/83928914  
153 Tagebücher: 1930 bis 1934, 67, entry Dec 10, 1931. 
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spaceless powers, which stand opposite from us as relentless adversaries,” 154 i.e. “the eternal 
enemy of the people, the Jew, democracy and capitalism—all only paraphrases for the same 
spirit of denial.”155 According to Goebbels, “The Jew is not smarter than we are, but only more 
refined and more cunning. His system cannot be broken economically, only politically.”156 
Goebbels demands that one must say yes or no to anti-Semitism and quotes Mussolini, to the 
effect that taking Jewish individuals out of circulation it is social hygiene. 
 Increasingly, Schmitt maintains contacts in right wing circles that help him alleviate his 
racial anxieties. December of 1931 marks the beginning of a long friendship with Werner 
Sombart, sociologist and author of an anthropological study that correlates the spreading of “the 
Jews” in Western Europe with the emergence of capitalism.157 During the same month, Schmitt 
socializes with Albrecht Günther, the editor of the radical journal Deutsches Volkstum.158 A few 
days later, Schmitt meets with economist Alexander Rüstow and notes their discussion about 
the unconstitutionality of the political fight against the National Socialists.159 Finally, in late 
December, Schmitt notes: “Disgust of the Jew shit Kelsen, no fear at all anymore.”160  The diary 
entries explain why Schmitt is in full support of the anti-Jewish laws after 1933, and also show 
how he was involved in anti-Semitism in the last year of the Weimar Republic. 
154 Joseph Goebbels, “Gegen den Volksfeind“ (1928) in: Der Angriff: Aufsätze aus der Kampfzeit (München: 
Zentralverband der NSDAP, 1935), 110. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Joseph Goebbels, “Der Jude“ (1929), op. cit. 
157 Werner Sombart, Die Juden im Wirtschaftsleben (München und Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1920). 
158 Tagebücher 1930-1934, 66, entry Dec 7, 1931. 
159 Ibid. 68, entry Dec 12, 1931. 
160 Ibid. 73, entry Dec 29, 1931. 
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3.2 Historical Change 
Several reasons may account for the fact that Schmitt, despite sympathies with racist 
ideas, does not yet officially align himself with the Nationalist Socialist Party or include anti-
Semitic statements in his public writing. As a university professor, he has sworn on the Weimar 
constitution. In his publications, he keeps a high academic profile until he starts to publish for 
radical journals such as the European Revue and Deutsches Volkstum around 1931. Anti-
Semitism was not limited to the NSDAP. “Ethnically chauvinist and racist ideas…had been 
spreading in Europe since the nineteenth century.”161 According to the Munich Documentation 
Centre for the History of National Socialism, the adoption of racist and anti-Semitic elements 
by ethnic-chauvinistic thinking  
made membership in the German Volk into a preeminent virtue. The result was a 
campaign of agitation for racial homogeneity and authoritarian order, with the 
people taking priority over the individual. Liberal and individualistic values were 
to be expunged from the ‘body’ of the German people.162 
The connection of racism with anti-individualism, as well as the demand for homogeneity and 
authoritarian rule in German society from the early 1920s on, supports my argument that 
Schmitt’s anti-individualism helps to explain his racism. It also suggests the possibility that 
Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and individualism, for example in The Concept of the Political, 
already shares in the racist views of its times.  Yet according to Mehring, it is “to a large extent 
assured that Schmitt wanted to prevent Hitler’s coming to power.”163 Evidence for that can be 
seen in Schmitt’s professional support for the Weimar state under the Hindenburg presidency. 
In 1932, the final year of the Weimar Republic, Schmitt officially and unofficially 
supports the minority governments of Papen and Schleicher who are appointed chancellors by 
161 Exhibit Guide (Munich Documentation Centre for the History of National Socialism), 21. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Mehring, Biography, 301. 
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Hindenburg. Schmitt, as the leading German expert on emergency law, supports Hindenburg’s 
ruling by decree and on several occasions prepares secret emergency plans, according to which 
the minority government could stay in power without new elections, beyond the sixty days 
permitted by the constitution. Schleicher’s plan, the Querfront, is supposedly a militarily 
enforced coalition between left, center and part of a split-up NSDAP, under a ban of the 
Communists.  Having already worked on plans for constitutional reform, Schmitt has the 
prospect of realizing some of his proposals in a new government. According to Schmitt’s diary, 
Eugen Ott, Schleicher’s negotiator and Erich Marcks, Schleicher’s press chief, visit and consult 
with him frequently from Dec. 2, 1932 until Schleicher’s resignation Jan. 28, 1933, when 
Hindenburg decides against the Schleicher plan and in favor of a Hitler/Papen coalition. 
Johannes Popitz, secretary without special area and Prussian treasurer of state from 1933, is also 
part of the Schmitt’s circle of friends. In a later interview, Popitz explains how the growing 
national opposition against the lack of totality in the German state was partly traditional, partly 
military, and partly oriented towards Hitler. A substantial constitutional reform could only be 
tied to the president. According to Popitz, the choice for Hitler results from the failure of the 
presidential reform, which means that only the path of revolution remains.164  
After January 30, 1933, Schmitt remains ambivalent about Hitler, discusses openly his 
anti-Semitic views and is finally swayed. On the day of Hitler’s appointment, he writes, 
“Excited, glad, cheerful.”165 On the next day: “Rage about the stupid, ridiculous Hitler.”166      A 
few weeks later, he discusses the hopelessness of the one-party system for Germany.167    In 
164 Lutz-Arwed Bentin, Johannes Popitz und Carl Schmitt: Zur wirtschaftlichen Theorie des totalen Staates in 
Deutschland (München: C.H. Beck, 1972), 39. 
165 Diary 1930-34, entry Jan 30, 1933. 
166 Ibid, entry Jan 31, 1933. 
167 Ibid, entry Feb 27, 1933. 
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March, Schmitt notes the “shamelessness of the assimilation”168 of the Jews, “rage attack 
against the Jew Kaufmann and the vulgar doings of those assimilators”169 and then discussions 
about the “question of Jewish university professors.”170 On April 4, 1933, the law that removes 
Jewish officials from government positions171 is enacted. The same night, Schmitt has “fear for 
Germany because of the revenge of the Jews.”172 He refuses to sign a petition for Kelsen and 
comments, “wretched company, to campaign like that for a Jew, while they cold-bloodedly let 
thousands of decent people starve and be deprived. This power of the Jews.”173 Effective May 
1, 1933, Schmitt joins the NSDAP. 
In a little over six months, Schmitt rises to a powerful professional position. He becomes 
the leader of the group of university teachers in the association of NS jurists.174 This honor 
follows his appointment by Goering to the Council of State (Staatsrat) for Prussia, 175 his call to 
Berlin University, his membership in Frank’s Academy for German Law, and his appointments 
to be co-editor of the German Jurist News (Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung) 176 and scientific 
consultant to the Institute for International Law.177 In early October, Schmitt hears a 
“[w]onderful speech by Hitler on the total state. Very consoled.”178  
168 Ibid, entry Mar 18, 1933. 
169 Ibid, entry Mar19, 1933. 
170 Ibid. Entry Mar. 25, 1933. 
171 Gesetz über die Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums 
172 Ibid. Entry Apr.15, 1933. 
173 Ibid. Entry Apr. 18, 1933.  
174 Reichsgruppenleiter der “Fachgruppe Hochschullehrer” in BNSDJ, later Rechtswahrerbund 
175 Bio 330 
176 Ibid. 332 
177 Ibid. 334 
178 Diaries, entry Oct. 3, 1933. 
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3.3 Racial Identity 
In Staat, Bewegung, Volk, his first large publication for the Nazis, Schmitt aims to 
establish “[l]eadership and racial identity (Artgleichheit) 179 as basic concepts of Nationalist 
Socialist law.” 180 The requirement of unity in a strong one-party state entails giving up all liberal 
democratic methods, such as elections and the separation of legislative and executive powers. 
According to Schmitt, the concept of leadership entails duties that are “inaccessible to the 
legalistic thought of individualist liberalist law.”181 Such duties are those of loyalty and 
obedience and apply both to civil servants and the ethnic German “comrades” (Volksgenossen). 
Schmitt distinguishes leadership from dictatorship and from the NS governance that he deems an 
outflow of the concrete and substantial thought of the movement (i.e. the party). The concept of 
leadership “contains the positive requirement of a necessary racial identity (Artgleichheit) 
between leader and following.”182 Not naming Jews directly, Schmitt refers to the liberal and 
Marxist enemies as “at times criticizing in a superior way, at times submissively assimilating.”183 
The task of law should be to distinguish between the racially identical and the racially alien. In 
his view, the liberal-democratic legal system has the flaw that, so as not to make racial 
distinctions,  
one spoke of “personality” only in a universal sense, and that the word connoted, 
in the service of a liberal individualism, only the “human” and not the concrete 
German people.184 
 
Instead of being bound to deceptive legal statutes (i.e. those postulating equality before the law 
and individual rights), German law should be bound to the requirement of an absolute racial 
179 Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1933), 32. 
180 Schmitt uses the term “race” (Rasse) only twice. P. 42 In reference to Hitler and Frank. “If the thought of race 
was again and again put in the center…it was not a theoretical postulate.” 
181 Ibid. 36. 
182 Ibid. 42. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 44. Here Schmitt relates to the “concrete order thinking” in law. 
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identity. In 1935, Schmitt praises the Nuremberg Race Laws, co-authored by his former student 
Ernst Rudolf Huber,185 as German liberation from the alien domination of liberalism, which, in 
Schmitt’s estimation, resulted in a way to think of law and constitution that was “completely 
entangled into the conceptual net of un-German systems.”186 Against the liberal concept of 
Gleichheit (equality), the concept of Artgleichheit (racial identity) works ingeniously and 
polemically to replace individual identity with group identity. It works to support the argument 
that German Jews are not members of the German people, even though they hold citizenship. 
Schmitt’s endorsement of institutional guarantees over individual rights in case of a reform of 
the Weimar constitution could have been intended to effect exclusion.  
In Verfassungslehre, Schmitt postulates that democracy depends on the unity of a people 
and that that unity depends on the homogeneity of a people. Against the liberal idea of equality, 
he holds that 
(p)olitical democracy cannot rest on the lack of difference between people, but only 
on the belonging to a certain people, where this belonging to a people can be 
determined by very different moments (ideas of common race, belief, common fate 
or tradition).187 
Race is one of several possible factors. For the case of national minorities, Schmitt considers 
several solutions, first of all peaceful assimilation, under contemporary minority protection of 
the rights of individuals, such as equality, freedom, property, and the use of one’s own 
language. But he also describes the alternative: 
The other method is faster and more violent: disposal of the alien component 
by oppression, resettlement of the heterogeneous population and similar radical 
means.188 
185 Philipp Gessler, “Carl Schmitt und Ernst Rudolf Huber: NS-Juristen und ihre Rolle nach 1945“ 
(Deutschlandfunk, Jan 27, 2016). Online, accessed Feb.2, 2016, 
http://www.deutschlandradiokultur.de/carl-schmitt-und-ernst-rudolf-huber-ns-juristen-und-
ihre.976.de.html?dram:article_id=343758  
186 Carl Schmitt, “Die Verfassung der Freiheit,” Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung (40:19, 1 Oct 1935): 1133-35. 
187 Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 228. 
188 Ibid. 232. 
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The United States’ immigration control is one of Schmitt’s examples. He also mentions new 
practices in citizenship laws, the possibilities of expatriation, denaturalization, etc. The central 
concept should be the people, not the individual and not humanity. Schmitt’s thesis for 
democracy is the same as for the total Führer state: the necessary condition is homogeneity—
the “identity of ruler and ruled, those commanding and those following.”189 In another text from 
1926, Schmitt writes: 
Each actual democracy rests not only on treating the same in the same way, but 
also with inevitable consequence, in treating the different differently. Therefore, 
to democracy belongs necessarily, first homogeneity, and second—if necessary—
the elimination or annihilation of the heterogeneous.190  
 
A closer look at the argument shows that he uses historical examples for support, such as the 
Greek-Turkish conflict and the Australian white-only immigration policy. Thus Schmitt makes 
an inductive argument but claims that his conclusion follows with necessity, which is not 
correct for an inductive argument. In the German case, Schmitt thinks that peaceful assimilation 
has been unsuccessful.191 Because various factors can account for heterogeneity, Schmitt’s 
postulate of homogeneity does not require any proof of biological differences. Nevertheless, it 
is important to ask what Schmitt’s conception of race is, and why he thinks that Jewish people 
meet such a criterion of difference. Even after the Nazi period, Schmitt maintains that “Jews 
189 Ibid. 234. 
190 Schmitt, Carl, “Der Gegensatz von Parlamentarismus und moderner Massendemokratie.“ Hochland, 23:2 
(1926):263. “Jede wirkliche Demokratie beruht darauf, daß nicht nur Gleiches gleich, sondern, mit 
unvermeidlicher Konsequenz, das Nichtgleiche nicht gleich behandelt wird. Zur Demokratie gehört also 
notwendig erstens Homogenität und zweitens--nötigenfalls--die Ausscheidung oder Vernichtung des 
Heterogenen.” Translated in: --. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. Ed. Thomas McCarthy. 
Trans.by Ellen Kennedy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988.  Kennedy’s mistranslates the last phrase as 
“eradication of heterogeneity.” 
191 Mehring, Biography, 316. 
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always remain Jews. While the communist can better and change himself, that has nothing to do 
with Nordic race etc. Just the assimilated Jew is the true enemy.”192  
3.4 Against the Jewish Spirit 
Schmitt’s concept of race is vaguely formulated, but mostly focused on correlating 
race with a specific Jewish “spirit,” i.e. a specific way of thinking. In SBV, comments focus 
on different meanings and interpretations of the same words in different languages as the 
“spheres of organic, biological and ethnic (völkischen) differences.”193 The way of thinking 
that enables someone to “see facts correctly, hear statements correctly” depends on the 
existential belonging to the community that creates the law.”194 Even though he claims to be 
strictly scientific, Schmitt remains vague about the relation between biology and ethnicity. 
Because of his indeterminate account of race, I think that it could be characterized as 
anthropological. 
Schmitt’s account is close to that of his friend Werner Sombart, one of Germany’s 
prominent sociologists of the early twentieth century. Sombart views Jews to be neither a 
biological race nor an “only religious community.”195 Sombart claims: 
The Jew is politically individualistic. The “constitutional state” complies with his 
sense, in which all relationships are deduced from clearly circumscribed law 
relationships. He is born representative of a “liberal” world view.196  
192 Carl Schmitt, Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1947 bis 1958. Expanded Edition, ed. Gerd Giesler 
and Martin Tielke (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2015), 14. Entry from 25 Sep, 1947. 
193 SBV, 45. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Werner Sombart, Die Juden im Wirtschaftsleben (München und Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1920), 353. 
196 Ibid, 318. 
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Sombart uses a non-biological conception of race in his thesis that “the Jews are of an 
anthropologically different kind.”197 Even “if no somatic common property can be found,”198 
Sombart thinks that the term “race” is the most suitable and concludes that “the anthropological 
homogeneity of the Jewish tribe is securely established.”199 How strictly scientific this 
approach, which both Schmitt and Sombart take, is questionable. Sombart claims scientific 
authority for his anthropological study of the Jews. According to him, his “book does not 
contain value judgments.”200 This authority is supposed to prove counter-examples wrong. 
Sombart admits that almost everyone has a Jewish friend to whom the book’s generalizations do 
not apply. But for Sombart, those counter-examples from personal relationships would contain 
value judgments and be “unmasked by a scientific investigation as un-scientific.”201 While in 
the correct application of the scientific method, counter-examples falsify a theory, Sombart 
practically claims that his theory is not falsifiable. Schmitt’s concept of race is, similarly to 
Sombart’s, anthropological, and thereby related to intellectual features.    
In a text from 1936, which Mehring ascribes to Schmitt,202 the “systematic undermining 
of a healthy ethnic German thinking about the state” is put into the “general context of the 
invasion of the Jewish people.”203 By pointing out the similarity of this critique, made during 
the conference Judaism in Jurisprudence, to Richard Wagner’s critique in his Judaism in Music, 
Mehring affirms a claim made by Raphael Gross—that Schmitt’s anti-Semitism reaches beyond 
traditional anti-Judaism that is argued on the basis of religion. Gross argues that, within 
197 Ibid, 353. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid, 346. 
200 Sombart, XV. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Reinhard Mehring, “Carl Schmitt und der Antisemitismus. Ein unbekannter Text.” Forum Historiae Iuris, 
online, accessed Feb. 2, 2016, http://www.forhistiur.de/legacy/debatte/CarlSchmitt/0603mehring2.htm  
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Catholic tradition, “good, catholic” anti-Semitism is set against “bad, anti-Christian” anti-
Semitism.204 Mehring, however, disagrees with Gross’s interpretation of Schmitt’s anti-
Semitism as biological, and argues that Schmitt’s anti-Semitism is neither biological nor 
religion-based, but grounded in the history of ideas. Mehring’s interpretation makes sense in 
context: Schmitt organizes the 1936 conference in order to eliminate Jewish intellectual 
influences from the German philosophy of law.  
But does an intellectual conception of race exhaust Schmitt’s racism or does he ascribe 
that particular way of thinking to all Jews?  In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt 
foreshadows his argumentation from 1933 and 1936, by claiming an epistemological difference 
in the distinction of friend and enemy 
The possibility to recognize and understand, and with it also the competence to 
have a say and to judge is here only given by the existential participation.205 
Here the epistemological difference applies to all existential participants, and suggests a 
friend/enemy constellation between groups on a large scale. This suggests that Schmitt does not 
apply his thesis merely to intellectuals, but considers the difference in thinking and judging to 
be a phenomenon that extends to someone by virtue of being part of a group.  
These examples from Schmitt’s Weimar Republic-era texts and the anti-Semitic content 
of his diaries provide support for Gross’s thesis that Schmitt’s theoretical work is permeated and 
significantly shaped by his anti-Semitism. Schmitt’s racism is also coherent with his anti-
individualistic arguments, in particular his refusal to acknowledge individual rights and his 
affirmation of a total state.   
204 Ibid. 
205 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 27. Der Begriff des Politischen, 27. My translation is more correct 
than Schwab’s. The German text:  “Die Möglichkeit richtigen Erkennens und Verstehens und damit auch die 
Befugnis mitzusprechen und zu urteilen ist hier nämlich nur durch das existenzielle Teilhaben und 
Teilnehmen gegeben.“ Schwab’s translation: “Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, 
understand and judge the concrete situation.” 
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Conclusion 
My investigation of Carl Schmitt’s concepts of the individual, race, and the total state 
shows the coherence of Schmitt’s positions along several lines. In the first section, I have 
demonstrated how Schmitt persistently takes a stand against individualism as a constituting 
component of political liberalism. He thereby undermines individual rights and equality before 
the law as stipulated in the Weimar constitution. The second section has shown that Schmitt 
endorses a total state, modeled after Italian fascism, as a modern political form in the 20th 
century and as a historical necessary. Beyond mere diagnostics, Schmitt actively helps to 
enforce the Nationalist Socialist views on race. The third section has shown that Schmitt 
maintains a cultural and geographical conception of race that claims to be scientific but 
generalizes stereotypes without taking evidence to the contrary into account. Schmitt’s 
argument for homogeneity uses empirical support and therefore cannot soundly claim necessity. 
Because of Schmitt’s rejection of individual rights, the totalization of the state and its 
exclusionary practices have no limits. 
As for Schmitt’s principles, there may be a change in his conception of the state, but 
against Schwab’s claims, I have not found a single principle that Schmitt would have to give up 
in his endorsement of racism. The state’s duty to actualize law, postulated in Wert des Staates, 
becomes in the Nazi period the duty to actualize ethnic law, and maybe Schmitt would say that 
the law includes a right to racism. Anti-individualism is an organizing principle for Schmitt’s 
argumentation. Racism is possible only through the rejection of individualism; that is also the 
case for totalitarianism. But possibly racial hostility and the quest for hierarchical order precede 
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and motivate Schmitt’s arguments against individualism. In light of Schmitt’s privately 
expressed views on the Jews, one can reevaluate a passage in Wert des Staates quoted earlier:206  
The ancient philosophers divided humanity into two halves, into masters and 
slaves, those who were able to hold rights and those who did not…Today, we 
praise ourselves that we don’t acknowledge such external factors anymore and 
don’t make a difference between persons before the law. But we should know 
that the meaning of our universal human freedom can only be, to work out the 
dualism in greatest objectivity, undeterred by the given social power 
relationships between groups, so that it is not external contingencies that 
decide.207  
As often as Schmitt expresses his perception of overbearing Jewish power, it is possible to infer 
that Schmitt already has a racial dualism in mind in 1913. The external contingencies could be 
the equality before the law stipulated by the 1871 constitution, so that Schmitt would return the 
Jews in Germany to subservient status.  Schmitt’s political justification of violence against 
minorities, whether racial, religious, or national, as the existential right of a people, contributes 
to the continuing danger of his theory. Schmitt’s examples point to exclusionary practices in 
nominally liberal states, such as the United States and Australia, which find reference again 
today. His ideas become relevant again as Europe moves anew toward nationalist orders. 
Therefore we should keep in mind that Schmitt’s claims for necessity are wrong. Whatever the 
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